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1 Matrix Expression of First Order conditions
1.1 Linear Tariffs and Double marginalization
Let Ir define the (J × J) ownership matrix of the retailer r that is diagonal and whose
element Ir(j, j) is equal to one if retailer r sells product j and zero otherwise. Let Sp be
the market share response matrix to retailer prices, containing the first derivatives of all
market shares with respect to all retail prices, i.e.
Sp ≡
⎛
⎜⎝
∂s1
∂p1 . . .
∂sJ
∂p1
...
...
∂s1
∂pJ
. . . ∂sJ∂pJ
⎞
⎟⎠
In vector notation, previous first order conditions (??) implies that the vector γ of retailer
r’s margins, i.e. the retail price p minus the wholesale price w minus the marginal cost of
distribution c, is1
γ ≡ p− w − c = − (IrSpIr)−1 Irs(p). (1)
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1Note that in all the following, when the inverse of non invertible matrices is used, it means the matrix
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Consider If the ownership matrix of manufacturer f that is diagonal and whose element
If (j, j) is equal to one if j is produced by the manufacturer f and zero otherwise. Pw the
(J × J)matrix of retail prices responses to wholesale prices, containing the first derivatives
of the J retail prices p with respect to the J 0 wholesale prices w, is introduced.
Pw ≡
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∂p1
∂w1 ..
∂pJ0
∂w1 ..
∂pJ
∂w1
...
...
...
∂p1
∂wJ0 ..
∂pJ0
∂wJ0
.. ∂pJ∂wJ0
0 .. 0 .. 0
0 .. 0 .. 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Note that the last J − J 0 lines of this matrix are zero because they correspond to private
label products for which wholesale prices have no meaning.
The first order conditions (??) can then be expressed in matrix form and the vector of
manufacturer’s margins is2
Γ ≡ w − μ = −(IfPwSpIf )−1Ifs(p). (2)
Pw can be deduced from the total differentiation of the retailer’s first order conditions (??)
with respect to wholesale price. Defining Spjp the (J × J) matrix of the second derivatives
of the market shares with respect to retail prices whose element (l, k) is ∂
2sk
∂pj∂pl
, we can
write equation (??) in matrix form3:
Pw = IrSp(Ir − eIr) £SpIr + IrS0pIr + (Sp1p Irγ|...|SpJp Irγ)Ir¤−1 . (3)
Equation (3) shows that one can express the manufacturer’s price cost margins vector
Γ = w− μ as depending on the function s(p) by substituting the expression (3) for Pw in
(2).
As mentionned in section 3, like Sudhir(2001) we can consider only the direct effect of
wholesale price on retail price. In this case, the matrix Pw has to be equal to the diagonal
matrix, with one on the diagonal except for columns corresponding to private labels where
it must be zero.
2Rows of this vector that correspond to private labels are zero.
3We use the notation (a|b) for horizontal concatenation of a and b.
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The model can also be considered where retailers and/or manufacturers collude per-
fectly simply by modifying ownership matrices. In the case of perfect price collusion
between retailers, the price cost margins of the retail industry can be obtained by replac-
ing the ownership matrices Ir in (1) by the identity matrix (the situation being equivalent
to a retailer in a monopoly situation). Similarly, the price-cost margins vector for manu-
facturers can be obtained in the case of perfect collusion by replacing the ownership matrix
If in (2) by a diagonal matrix where diagonal elements are equal to one except for private
label goods.
1.2 Two-part tariffs
1.2.1 With resale price maintenance
When w∗k = μk, the first order conditions become in matrix notation:
IfSp(γ + Γ) + Ifs(p) = 0. (4)
In the case of private label products, the first order conditions become in matrix
notation: for r = 1, .., R
(eIrSpIr)(γ + Γ) + eIrs(p) = 0 (5)
where eIr is the (J × J) ownership matrix of private label products of retailer r.
We thus obtain a system of equations with (4) and (5) where γ + Γ is unknown.
½
IfSp(γ + Γ) + Ifs(p) = 0 for f = 1, .., F
(eIrSpIr)(γ + Γ) + eIrs(p) = 0 for r = 1, .., R
After solving the system (see appendix ??), we obtain the expression for the total price-
cost margin of all products as a function of demand parameters and of the structure of
the industry:
γ + Γ = −
³X
r
IrS0p eIrSpIr +Xf S0pIfSp´−1 ³Xr IrS0p eIr +Xf S0pIf´ s(p). (6)
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Note that in the absence of private label products, this expression would simplify to the
case where the total profits of the integrated industry are maximized, that is
γ + Γ = −S−1p s(p) (7)
because then
P
f If = I.
When wholesale prices w∗k are such that p
∗
k(w
∗
k)−w∗k−ck = 0, the first order conditions
become in matrix notation: for all f = 1, .., F
γf + Γf = (p− μ− c) = −(IfSpIf )−1
h
Ifs(p) + IfSpeI(eγ + eΓ)i
where eγ + eΓ is the vector of all private label margins and eI is the ownership matrix for
private labels (eI =Pr eIr).
In this case, profit maximizing strategic pricing of private labels by retailers is also
taken into account by manufacturers when they choose fixed fees and retail prices for their
own products in the contract. The prices of private labels chosen by retailers maximize
their profit on these private labels and the total price cost margin eγr+eΓr for these private
labels will be such that
eγr + eΓr ≡ p− μ− c = −³eIrSp eIr´−1 eIrs(p). (8)
1.2.2 Without resale price maintenance
Then the first order conditions become in matrix notation: for all i ∈ Gf
IfPws(p) + IfPwSpIfΓ+ IfPwSp(p− w − c) = 0.
This implies that the manufacturer price cost margin is:
Γ = (IfPwSpIf )
−1 [−IfPws(p)− IfPwSp(p− w − c)] (9)
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that allows for an estimate of the price-cost margins with demand parameters using (1) to
replace (p− w − c) and (3) for Pw. Remark again that formula (1) directly provides the
total price-cost margin obtained by each retailer on his private label.
2 Detailed resolution of system of equations
Generically we have systems of equations to be solved in the following form
½
Af (γ + Γ) +Bf = 0
for f = 1, .., G
where Af and Bf are given matrices.
Solving this system amounts to solve the minimization problem
min
γ+Γ
XG
f=1
[Af (γ + Γ) +Bf ]
0 [Af (γ + Γ) +Bf ]
which leads to the following expression to be found as solution
(γ + Γ) =
µXG
f=1
A0fAf
¶−1XG
f=1
A0fBf .
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